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Abstract—Through the usage of cryptographically secure and
digitally scarce tokens, a next evolutionary step of the Internet
has come. Cryptographic token represent a new phenomena
of the crypto movement with the ability to program rules
and incentives to steer participant behaviors that transforms
them from purely technical to socio-economic innovations.
Tokens allow the coordination, optimization and governing large
networks of resources in a decentralized manner and at scale.
Tokens bring powerful network effects that reward participants
relative to their stage of adoption, the value they contribute and
the risk they bear in an auditable, decentralized and therefore
trustful way. We illustrate which important role tokenomics
plays in the creation of, and sustainable and efficient operation
of cooperations.
Keywords: Economy of Things, Socio-Economy, DLT,
Blockchain, Cryptoeconomics, Tokenomics, Token, Protocols,
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I. INTRODUCTION
Continous innovation and change is a constant companion
of man kind and general human interaction. Just as social
forms have changed, so have communication tools, money
or other economic principles. Out of many technological
advancements, the issuance of cryptographic token on a digital
distributed ledger has the potential to redefine social and
economic interaction over the Internet from scratch.
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) provides an organiza-
tionally decentralized alternative for maintaining certain states
and has the potential to transform the Internet of Information to
the Internet of Value. The difference between information and
value is scarcity. Organizationally decentralized but logically
centralized, temper-proof and accessible states will allow for
the creation of software protocols that can undermine the
power of centralized intermediaries.
Before Bitcoin, it was thought to be impossible to achieve
attack resistant consensus among unknown nodes in a dis-
tributed peer-2-peer (P2P) network1. Bitcoin introduced, for
the first time, a mathematical solution with the introduction of
a resilient consensus mechanism. Bitcoin’s “Proof-of-Work”
was the first consensus protocol that made economic cost of
attacking the system disproportionate to the benefit of doing
so. Bitcoin has proven over ten years that censorship and
counterfeiting is economically unprofitable.
1Byzantine General’s Problem
Cryptographic and game-theoretically secured this dis-
tributed consensus that sparked a new field of science around
economic coordination, also referred to as “Cryptoeconomics”.
It can be described as the study of efficient economic interac-
tion, beneficial to the participants in untrusted environments.
Although, in principle every participant could be corrupt,
sensible economic interaction is possible[1].
The Bitcoin blockchain is the first practical instance of
cryptoeconomics. It produces “trust by math” rather than trust
due to reasonable context or “justified trust by default of
a legal contract.” We refer to "trust by math" as trustless
environment[2].
In this primer we would like to shed light into these novel
concepts and to provide a comprehensive overview. Stepping
back from the hype, we want to provide a clear understanding
of the concept and power of Tokenomics without having to
know the details of DLT. Some readers will be surprised at
the opportunities it opens up for a more efficient, incentive
aligned and democratic economy.
A. Terminology
We start off by introducing some terminology and go more
in detail in subsequent chapters. The blockchain movement has
brought up fancy words like Cryptoeconomics or Tokenomics,
but beneath it all there are economic agents - human and
artificial - trying to connect. They must connect in order to
produce, create, exchange and communicate within a market.
1) Token: Generally speaking, a token is a thing which
serves as a visible, tangible or intangible representation of a
fact or a right. For example, a driving license card is a token
which represents the fact that you are trained and allowed to
drive a car.
A cryptographic token is a cryptographically secure, prov-
able representation of a fact or right, which can, additionally
be processed in digital systems like decentralized networks.
Tokens are digitized multi-purpose instruments, ranging from
simple-single to multi-complex designs. It could be value,
stake, voting right, or anything. A token is not limited to
one specific role or utility, it can fulfill a lot of roles in its
ecosystem, in-depth VIII-B.
The digital representation of a tangible or intangible asset
via a token on a DLT, is called Tokenization, which should
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rather be seen as a business construct or a tool than a technical
phenomena[3].
2) Cryptoeconomics and Tokenomics: Cryptoeconomics
and Tokenomics can be used almost interchangeably, as in the
early days of the internet, the terminology is lagging behind.
Cryptoeconomics can be understood as the combination of
cryptography, game-theory and economics to create robust
decentralized peer-to-peer networks. Cryptography is used
to prove things in the past, game-theory is used to design
the interaction protocols that are interlinked with economic
incentives to encourage desired properties to hold into the
future. Code and economics are intrinsically interlinked. The
underlying challenge is that in decentralized P2P systems, that
do not give control to any centralized party, one must assume
that there will be bad actors lurking to disrupt the system.
Tokenomics encompasses the concept of economic system
and optimization design to incentivize specific behaviors in a
community, using tokens to create a self-sustaining ad hoc
economy. It includes game theory, mechanism design, and
monetary economics. Tokenomics is a broader subject and
includes a variety of components which are introduced in
section IV.
One may seperate the fact, that cryptoeconomics mainly
focuses on the monetary-aspects of the system, whereas toke-
nomics has broader aspects than remunerative incentives, like
voting rights or network externalities. Nevertheless, we use
from now on the term tokenomics and consider the aspects of
cryptoeconomics within this term.
II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC EVOLUTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
DLT networks can be regarded as a socio-economic evo-
lution of the Internet. Blockchain protocols can be seen as
novel collaboration frameworks that provide higher levels of
transparency while reducing bureaucracy with self-enforcing
code. Blockchain protocols enable networks in a distributed
and decentralized manner, thereby minimizing principal-agent
dilemmas2 of organizations and subsequent moral hazards3
by introducing tokenized incentives. This networks can be
compared with digital representations of society and economy.
Cryptographic token, within those distributed networks, pro-
vide incentives to automatically align and enforce interests in
the absence of third parties (intermediaries). Due to this, we
believe that this protocols provide the substrate for the next
evolution of the Internet, Web 3.0, as it enables a new form
of decentralized human collaboration and offers the building
blocks of scalable and resilient collaboration frameworks.
A. IoT, EoT and dEoE
The term Economy of Things (EoT) evolved from Internet
of Things (IoT). Internet of things refers to the fact that
nowadays, due to ubiquitous connectivity, not only humans
connect via the web. It is also possible to build networks
2Wikipedia (2020): Principal-agent problem. Available online at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal%E2%80%93agent_problem
3Wikipedia (2020): Moral Hazard. Available online at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_hazard
of things like sensors, fridges, cars - so called IoT devices.
However, connecting everything with everything by itself is
not sufficient. The connected entities need to be able to interact
in ways comparable to established economic mechanisms such
as search and find, negotiation, payment, settlement, building
trust etc. in order to make use of the connectivity.
As discussed earlier in our paper (Poddey et. al 2019), the
IoT therefore needs to be converted into an EoT. However,
although broadly used, the trailing part ’of things’ is mislead-
ing. In fact, what is meant by EoT is a digital economy of
everything (dEoE) - a heterogeneous mix of e.g. small IoT
devices, more powerful digital entities like machine learning
based services running in the cloud and humans, interacting
seamlessly.
In Web2.0, functionality was basically centralized. The
functions of a service could in fact be split into several mod-
ules, but there typically is a central point of service providing
access. In Web3.0 even smaller modules can be incorporated
as individual entities, connecting and interacting with others
on their own behalf. These entities are usually called agents.
Web3.0 therefore can be understood as a multi-agent system in
which functionality - or in a more general form the capability
to achieve a goal - emerges from interaction of fragmentary
contributions. The capability therefore is no longer embodied
in a monolithic entity, but distributed across a network of
agents, each embedding only a part of the necessary modules.
Agents providing new fragmentary contributions might appear,
others disappear.
The dEoE therefore is a prime example of a complex open
context system and distributed ledger protocols will provide
the soil to the next evolutionary step of the Internet enabling
higher socio-economic output[4], in-depth VIII-A.
B. Protocols as efficient exchange coordinators
Protocols can be described as a set of rules or procedures
that govern the transfer of data between two or more electronic
devices. The protocol defines how data is structured, or how
the data is send from one to another party. Usually, those data
is used to described certain states between its participants.
States reflect the common knowledge of involved parties[5].
Protocols can be seen as routers of economic activity, as
systems of logic that coordinate exchange between suppliers
and consumers. Protocols encode the rules of engagement that
coordinate the exchange of a service between supplier and
consumer. All participants must strictly abide by the rules of
engagement, otherwise there will be no exchange. Therefore,
a protocol disables or at least, reduces human corruption. The
flatness with which a protocol treats everyone that is connected
to it, is part of what drives its efficiency as a coordinator of
exchange.
As exchange coordinator, a protocol should be minimally
extractive for its "user", whereas businesses are incentivized to
be maximally extractive. Protocols are in between supplier and
consumer, but are no classical centralized middle-man, that’s
why they are less extractive. In the absence of a central party,
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as with blockchain protocols, protocols provide structures for
businesses, but are no businesses per se.
Protocols enable and create networks of exchange, as the
TCP/IP created the Internet. Instead of being freely open
limitlessness, like the Internet, those crypto based protocols
now have limits. Limits are introduced through scarce token
that store the value of the whole protocol. Those limited
protocols now create, enable and entail economics[6].
C. The Delta to traditional economies
Traditionally, large parts of our society have been orga-
nized and secured by a legal system enforcing contractual
agreements which regulates the interactions within societies.
The governance rules hereby regulate the process of decision
making among all stakeholders involved and allows people to
interact within a community, network or an organization on a
sound basis. Rules enable exchange — economic exchange
but also social exchange. Those rules are enforced by the
government and its agencies, which provide a central authority.
Within a permissionless blockchain network, no central
authority exists to enforce those rules. The protocol underlying
the network automatically enforces the governance rules set
by the community. As such, the blockchain protocol is com-
parable to the constitution and laws of nation states. Those
protocols minimize the principal-agent dilemma or reduce
moral hazard in a resistant manner. Different researchers in
Economic science, e.g. Joseph E. Stiglitz, have engaged to
the proposition, that markets do not work in a simple and
idealized way and therefore nation states mainly steer the
actions of their citizens by disincentivize. If you break the
law, you either pay or go to jail[7]. Similar mechanisms, e.g.
burning the staked funds4, are hard-coded into a blockchain
protocol as with "Proof-of-Stake"5.
Incentivisation uniquely enabled through cryptographic to-
ken and self-enforcing rules within the network therefore
emphasize a radical change, in-depth IV-B. Those networks
have the potential to align stakeholders by the consensus
rules. Token would incentive individual behavior in a global
distributed network to collectively contribute to a common
goal, we refer to this as tokenized network.
One important difference between economics and toke-
nomics is that economics most often starts with predictive
goals, and tokenomics mainly starts with design goals. This
provides the possibility to design a ecosystem according to the
desired properties and core values in order to avoid e.g. power
concentration or plutarchy[8].
To summarize, token-based networks can be compared to
some kind of digital nation state, where each digital state
has their own interest area, rules and desired system goals.
The biggest advantages thereby, ensuring trust by trustless
technologies and automatization through self-enforcing rules
and incentives.
4Staking simply stands for holding a cryptocurrency in a wallet for a fixed
period, then earning interest on it.
5Ethereum Wiki (2020): Proof of Stake. Available online at
https://eth.wiki/en/concepts/proof-of-stake-faqs
III. NOVEL COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS
Cooperation is a complex system with an open context,
which must be designed and tested primarily on an inter-
human level. Conventional cooperation frameworks for coop-
erative orchestrated (software) ecosystems are mostly hierar-
chical structured and perform manually processed processes
that can hardly meet the requirements of international collabo-
rations with a multitude of stakeholders. They usually lack the
necessary degree of consistently fair co-determination rules,
since hierarchical structures are very susceptible to individuals
making decisions that are not in the public interest. If, on
the other hand, everyone is involved in the decision-making
process, efficiency and scalability suffer and the collaboration
is literally paralysed as the number of participants increases.
Therfore it exists a tension between scalability, i.e. the number
of decisions that a collective can make in a given period of
time, and resilience, i.e. the incorruptibility of these decisions.
In addition, the success of open innovation initiatives often
fails due to the lack of incentive mechanisms for investors to
make financial and non-monetary contributions to stimulate
further development in a sustainable way[9].
A. Why conventional approaches fail
Conventional approach to build a commons-based digital
infrastructure failed without strong incentives.
Quaero6 was a European research and development program
initiated in 2008 aiming to realize a European search engine
surpassing American-based ones. Critics immediately realised
that “Going head-to-head with Google with a project involv-
ing well-funded, energetic entrepreneurs would be foolish.
Attempting the same with a multi-government collaboration
is beyond description.”. In 2015 Quaero was aborted after
spending more than 200Me of public funds[10].
The problem of building commons based digital infrastruc-
tures can be thought of as a “Knowledge Contribution Game”,
where two parties called “Leader” and “Follower” iteratively
decide whether to contribute to the digital infrastructure of
defect/free-ride7. Such a game is very similar to the mechanics
of Open Source Software (OSS) projects and provides two
fundamental insights[11]:
1) If leaving uncontrolled, the conventional approach will
result in both parties defecting. Such an outcome can be
seen in some OSS-projects.
2) If it turns out to be economically beneficial, then mutual
contribution will definitely happen. Such an outcome can
be achieved by implementing the right incentives.
In this respect, it is key to realize that a common and
shared strategic goal is necessary but not sufficient to avoid
the free-rider problem. The free-rider problem can temporarily
alleviated by public funding but as this funding is based on
the work done and not the results achieved the incentive
6Wikipedia (2019): Quaero. Available online at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quaero
7The free-rider problem is a type of market failure that occurs when those
who benefit from public resources do not pay for them
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Fig. 1. Knowledge Contribution Game to model building process of commons-based infrastructure
to provide a long-term operating infrastructure is limited.
This is especially true, if no long-term subsidizing by public
authorities is planned. Long-term incentive alignment play a
crucial role to ensure long-term goal orientated cooperation
and contribution within a stakeholder group.
B. Digitalization of Governance
The coordination of the participants therefore requires a
well-considered design approach and a collection of sophis-
ticated rules and processes, which are summarized under the
term "Governance". Governance is an applied social problem
and generally refers to the process of reaching social con-
sensus. Guidelines, decision-making and conflict-resolution
processes for cooperation can take different forms in its
degree of formalization and ways of implementation. Today’s
cooperations are build on paper-based contracts or informal
agreements which includes a set of exchange conditions. Those
are manually interpreted and enforced by legal action at a
higher instance like e.g. a nation state court. Machine-readable
and verifiable contracts and digital tokens as a representation
of rights and tool for incentives provides the foundation to
digitize governance processes across multi un-trusted parties.
An example demonstrate Decentralized Autonomous Or-
ganizations (DAO)8. An implementation of cooperation that
lives autonomously in virtual space. It uses social networks
combined with Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) as a
collaboration tool. The organizational structure and processes
for decision-making are digitally mapped without the need
of a central intermediary. Trust is created in software and
processes through open source code and targeted contributions
are encouraged through token-based incentive mechanisms.
DAOs currently still raise legal and technical questions, but
they provide an outlook on how contracts and cooperation
processes will be gradually transferred to the digital age.
8Wikipedia (2020): Decentralized Autonomous Organizations. Online avail-
able at https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dezentralisierte_Autonome_Organisation
IV. TOKENOMICS
Tokenomics is an emerging field of economic coordination
games in cryptographically secured P2P networks. The term
emerged in the developer community and gained traction by
academia but it still remains under-design, possibly because it
is often used in different contexts leads to different meanings
when trying to come up with a general definition.
Tokenomics applies game theoretic mechanism design in
combination with cryptography to create robust decentralized
P2P protocols. The main characteristics are the following:
• Building systems (networks) that have certain desired
properties
• Using game-theory and economic incentives to encourage
the system to hold desired properties in the future
• Using cryptography to prove properties about the past,
makes it tamper-proof
Tokenomics is interdisciplinary and requires a deep un-
derstanding of cryptography as well as game-theory. The
cryptography underlying these systems is what makes the
P2P communication within the networks secure, and the
game-theory is what incentivizes all actors to contribute to
the network so that it continues to develop over time. The
incentive mechanism is designed to make the network fault-
tolerant and attack-resistant. Beyond, mechanism design leads
the system evolve to the desired properties over time. This
allows entities who do not know one another to reliably reach
consensus about the right state[12].
By introducing scarce tokens, thus limits as mentioned in
II-B, protocols allows for (social) coordination in evolving,
complex open system formed by a large number of par-
ticipants. This coordination, based on game-theoretical and
economic principles embedded in the protocol, evolves the
system as a whole towards the desired properties.
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George A. Akerlof9 wrote in his famous ’lemon markets’
paper about markets with information asymmetry: "It should
also be perceived that in these markets social and private
returns differ, and therefore, in some cases, governmental
intervention may increase the welfare of all parties. In other
words, free markets (without any intervention) will, in general
not lead to efficiency; it is even only under exceptional
circumstances that free markets are efficient."
Tokenomics can now be used to properly design efficient
markets. This means, protocol and incentive mechanism design
aligns stakeholder interests in order to create more efficient
markets.
Each participant acts "selfish", that means, from his or
her local point of view profit maximisation. Game theoretical
mechanism design ensures that the system properties result and
that the individual players do not benefit disproportionately[4].
The more complex and larger the networks are, consisting
of different stakeholders, the more important and significant is
the design of game theoretical mechanisms. Cryptography can
be seen as a linear component, whereas game theory rather an
exponential and complex one.
A. Cryptography to secure the present and past
A consensus mechanism is a set of self-enforcing rules
and process that define how different nodes can reach an
agreement on the true state of the network. Proof-of-Work is
the first implementation of a distributed consensus protocol.
The protocol is primarily based on expensive computer com-
putation involving hashing (SHA-256), Merkle Tree and P2P
networking for creating, broadcasting and verifying blocks on
the network[13].
In such a setup, if you abide to the rules, you earn money.
It is uneconomical to misbehave, since you get no reward for
playing against the rules. The mining computers (miners) in
this network validate each block and compete with each other.
The competition is about a cryptographic puzzle, where all
miners compete to be the first to solve the mathematical prob-
lem behind the puzzle. Only the right unique hash value will
solve the puzzle. The first miner that solves the mathematical
puzzle is allowed to write the transactions to the blockchain
thereby creating the next block. In return, the winner earns a
"block reward" for the costs incurred in form of net network
tokens.
This means that all network participants that work towards
adding blocks of transactions to the ledger can potentially earn
network tokens. By participating in this competition, miners
collectively make sure that all transactions included in a block
are valid[1].
B. Economics to incentivize evolution towards desired prop-
erties
"Show me the incentives and I will show you the
outcome." - Charlie Munger
9Wikpedia (2020): George A. Akerlof. Available online at
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_A._Akerlof
The Psychology of Human Misjudgment10, a speech given
in 1995 by Charlie Munger11, illustrated how behavioral psy-
chology can be applied to business, economics and problem-
solving. Charlie Munger illustrated how psychology can be
used to obtain more structured and thorough understanding of
how incentives shape human actions. Sometimes the solution
to a behavior problem is simply to review and adapt incentives
to make sure they align with the desired goal.
Money is one of the greatest forces of social good, be-
sides social norms. Remunerative incentives align interest. It
keeps people honest. Monetary incentives should be integrated
into many areas of socio-economic interaction as possible to
achieve the desired behaviour. Punishment, e.g. through taxes,
works good to prevent actions whereas incentives work best
to encourage them.
V. FROM INCENTIVES TO TOKENIZED INCENTIVES
Incentives drive human behavior. Understanding incentives
is key to understanding people and socio-economy. Vice versa,
failing to recognize the importance of incentives can lead
to misconstructions and errors. Incentive mechanisms can be
described as rules of the game for groups of individuals which
are designed in such a way, that certain goals are achieved
if the group members act rationally on their own benefit
within the framework of these rules. The desired social state is
then compatible with the individual incentives. The group can
be a society, an organisation or a community of contractual
partners.
Incentive mechanisms serve to implement the given social
goal by a non-cooperative balance of the resulting game.
Incentives can be either:
1) Negative incentives and control: Increases willingness to
show the desired behavior by sanctioning its undesired
counterpart.
2) Positive incentives and enabler: Enables and increases
willingness to show the desired behavior by rewarding
it.
Incentive mechanisms are a conceptual tool of economic and
game-theory. They are used for economic analysis in various
fields of economics, e.g. incentive mechanisms in the taxation
of industrial economics, the allocation of goods, resources
and risks or the economics of the public sector. Incentives
can be any kind of reward or punishment that range from
remunerative to solely moral or reputational aspects[14].
Tokens are a central component of the solution to the
coordination problem12. By means of tokens, one can create
efficient alignment of different stakeholders within a network.
For outsiders, tokens act as speculative objects, which again
does not correspond to the reality of the token economy.
Tokens, properly designed, represent the ownership of scarce
10YouTube (2020): The Psychology of Human Misjudgment, Available
online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pqzcCfUglws
11Wikipedia (2020): Charlie Munger. Available online at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Munger
12Wikipedia (2020): Coordination game. Available online at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordination_game
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digital resources and coordinate the actors in a given network,
e.g. through block rewards in the Bitcoin network[15]. It
has become increasingly important to design the right set of
incentives that can achieve the desired system-level behavior.
The different types of incentives within a token-based
economy need to be aligned in order to properly design the
token. The token can then be used to orchestrate the creation
and governing the evolution of those protocols. Blockchain
protocols provide a new way of issuing, redeeming and
automatically enforcing the rights associated to these tokens,
in a digital and distributed manner. It is therefore economically
irrational for a participant to disregard the established rules,
as the economic benefit to behave against the rules leads to a
lower surplus for the individual.
A. Remunerative Incentive
For simplicity, we focus in this primer solely on remuner-
ative incentives. Moral and coercive incentives are important,
but less likely to demonstrate.
Remunerative incentives, analogue to monetary-incentives,
lay the foundation to DLT-based networks. Those incentives
provide the operators of the network with financial rewards
in order to sustain the network, e.g. in Bitcoin blockchain the
block rewards.
In addition to the upper block rewards, there are other finan-
cial incentives conceivable. The most common used financial
incentive form of tokens are Initial Coin Offerings (ICO).
ICO’s are used to fund and kickstart the development of a
digital collaboration.
One of the most fundamental steps for entrepreneurs is
to find capital to fund their idea. Leveraging the blockchain
technology, organizations have only recently started to fund
their operations with ICOs.
Those ICO can be compared to traditional Initial Public
Offerings (IPO), but offers additional advantages e.g. di-
rect democratic participation. During ICOs, orgnaizations dis-
tribute their cryptographic tokens to investors in exchange for
capital. Investors become token holders and provide different
functions and utilities within the issuer’s network as soon as
the project is launched[16].
The funding amounts in ICOs exceed most investment
rounds by traditional funding vehicles. Recent data shows an
average of 1600 investors per ICO, with average funds raised
of $9 million. Conventional crowdfunding is dramatically
smaller and much less internationalised[17].
Considering tokens, in particular utility tokens13, can be the
incentive mechanism necessary to boost the development of
the respective infrastructure via an ICO.
Due to insufficient regulation and business practice, token
issuers can take advantage of a SAFT, in-depth VIII-D. To
speed up alignment process, a bridging vehicle is required.
Such a bridging vehicle is a "Simple Agreement for Future
Tokens" (SAFT). SAFT is a financing contract for an option
13Utility Token can be regarded as a kind of exchange or resource that
guarantees certain functionalities, voting rights or access within a network.
on a token offering. The aim of this SAFT would be, that
a founding entity can sell such an agreement to their early
investors and partners instead of tokens in a fast and regulated
manner. Hence, through their capital, investors acquire the
right to future tokens at a preferential price, in-depth VIII-D.
VI. TOKENIZE TO MAKE IT A SUCCESS
Incentive-efficient funding increase the so-called leverage
effect of funding instruments, e.g. the effect of subsidies on
private expenditure as an input for R&D activity.
The reason for this is the simultaneous divergence of
interests and information between potential recipients and
funding agencies. In principle, funding policy can therefore
be approached at two levels, namely through:
1) Reducing the information asymmetry, i.e. the alignment
of the divergent information situations of the funding
recipient and the funding agency or
2) Incentive mechanisms that align the interests of funding
recipients with those of the (welfare-maximizing) fund-
ing provider
By interlinking the two interest groups, principal and agent,
the behaviour of the agent can be controlled. This agent is to
be encouraged to efficiently perform the contractually agreed
and owed service and not to deceive the principal either
before or after contract conclusion[18]. Interlinking principal
and agent on basis of incentive alignment through the use
of cryptographic tokens, allows a target-oriented and efficient
funding project progress.
A well-balanced token design would incentivize network
participants to take a risk in adopting a new platform before it
is clear that it is worth it, and reward them with ownership that
will have future value thanks to their contribution. Comapara-
ble to investment in startups. Token design is a complex and
time-consuming endeavor that includes social choice, financial
and legal aspects.
VII. CONCLUSION
Tokens are far more than the publicly perceived financial
speculation instruments. Token can represent a multitude of
aspects like e.g. ownership or rights of participation and are an
integral part of incentive mechanisms, which leads fair digital
ecosystems to high efficiency.
Tokenomics can contribute to speeding up the evolution of
incentive-based decentralized ecosystem.Tokenized incentives
align multiple interests alongside a desired outcome, from the
funding towards the desired long-term oriented system prop-
erties. Tokenomics therefore assures a long-term perspective
to coopetitive14 collaboration in the digital age.
Adherence to the principles and values that are designed and
set through the evolutionary process of a digital collaboration
can lead to a functioning market economy characterized by
socio-economic efficiency. Efficiency by means of resource
allocation provides better socio-economic output in the sense
for each individual and for the digital cooperative as a whole.
14The term "coopetition" is composed of "cooperation" and "competition".
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. A: Coalition games, coopetition and efficiency
The combination of competition and cooperation at the same
time is referred to as coopetition.
Coopetition in supermodular15 systems generates a surplus.
The larger the set of agents taking part, the larger the total
surplus. Therefore, the goal is to achieve what is called
the ’grand coalition’. The dEoE tend to be supermodular.
Therefore, it is important to establish a coopetition based dEoE
based on adequate surplus sharing, both, from a viewpoint of
most efficient capability increase, as well as socioeconomic
sense.
For example taking a certain action in a certain system state,
or, in the coopetition model, contributing a certain element,
typically takes effect in a time-, state- and network participant
distributed fashion. There may even arise local positive effects
to the actor, while related costs are (mainly not directly
identifiable) distributed to others.
This effect is referred to a externalities and related to
imperfect information.
Joseph Stiglitz, George A. Akerlof and A. Michael Spence
jointly received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sci-
ences (2001) for their research in the context of the theory
of markets with asymmetric information. Stiglitz is a distinct
critic of the idea of the invisible hand applied to economics
in the sense that free markets should lead to effciency as if
guided by unseen forces.
In other words, free markets (without any intervention)
will, in general not lead to effciency; it is even only under
exceptional circumstances that free markets are efficient.
Based on these insights, we argue that the formation of
the dEoE should not be left over to unregulated markets.
It requires dedicated and continuous methodological support
establishing such a dynamically adapting balance as mentioned
by Stiglitz. Not least to prevent a comparable outcome to
Web2.0, where the utility and power aggregated in the hands
of a few quasi platform monopolists, taking advantage of it to
the detriment of smaller competitors and society. One of the
goals of the algorithmic and social mechanisms based self-
governance, in combination with societal governance of dEOE
endeavors is to establish functioning market economy.
dEOE is not about naive cooperation, but coopetition. It is
important for a functioning market economy to have a healthy
competition, e.g. about providing key expertise.
Diminishing competition and arising monopolies have a
detrimental effect to the total system. Over and above, for
complex systems operating in open contexts, diversity i.a. in
the form of competence is important for antifragility and hence
persistence of the system. Therefore, a competition based
diversity on the one hand, balanced by an adequate protection
of minorities form the breeding ground for futures contributors
of key expertise and hence prevailing efficiency.
15Supermodularity is related to convex coalition games, and the solution
concept introduced by Lloyd S. Shapley (1953)
Maximizing the benefit from a local perspective (associated
to selfishness of agents) is not evil per se, but the reflection
of a necessary contribution to efficiency of the total system.
It needs to be counterbalanced such, that entity-local maxi-
mization leads to maximization of globally desirable outcomes
(i.e. socio-economic optimal results). This compensation also
addresses the free-rider issue[4].
B. B: Token Taxonomy
Establishing a consistent and reliable taxonomy for crypto-
graphic assets, known as token, is important to laying a foun-
dation from which developers, policymakers, and investors can
make more sense of how to design, apply, or regulate tokens.
Cryptographic assets do pose a challenge on regulators
because they integrate properties of currencies, commodities
and payment systems, and the resulting classification will have
implications for their legal and regulatory treatment. Some to-
kens might represent completely new asset classes, like native
protocol tokens that have hybrid functions, which are not easy
to classify, from tokens that might very simply represent assets
of the existing economy that are easily classified, understood
from a business logic perspective, and therefore also regulated.
An example of assets that are easy to classify or regulate
are tokenized securities, comparable to conventional securities.
In practice, many of the utility tokens also serve as means
of payment within their network and are thus also kind of
’payment/currency token’, this makes a clear-cut classification
difficult. The taxonomy presented here intends to give a broad
overview of the different properties and types of tokens.
Fig. 2. Classification of Cryptoassets based on Fabric Venture Analysis[15]
The main utility for each token type are illustrated below:
• Currency & Commodity: Focus on payments and store
of value, e.g. Bitcoin
• Utility Token: Integral part of the platform itself with
additional functionality, e.g. Ethereum
• Security Token: Represent the value of an underlying
off-chain asset, thereby enhancing liquidity, divisibility
and access.
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C. C: Cryptoeconomic Primitives
Economic primitives exist in the analog world. Primitives
are generous and well established building blocks of markets
that developed over time and form the tools used in interna-
tional markets and business in general. However, blockchain
technology has opened up a whole new way of doing business
and enables economic applications previously not possible.
These new applications require new building blocks.
Cryptoeconomic primitives can be understood as proto-
col based incentive systems linked to an underlying, unique
cryptographic token. The token enables the coordination and
allocation of resources to achieve a shared goal through the
use of economic and cryptographic mechanisms. A token is
therefore inevitable to build a decentralized self-sustaining
system. Without the token, the system will fail or work less
efficient than with a token[19].
A cryptoeconomic primitive should result in the predictable
coordination of a set of actors (whether it be humans or
machines) towards some specific shared goal or outcome.
This can include predictably failing in certain situations and
knowing limitations.
One example can be found in the category of Curation
markets. Curation markets are a certain primitive, that is
specifically designe to curate information and reduce informa-
tion asymmetry. The most known primitives are Token Curated
Registries (TCRs) and Curved Bonding. Both share the same
goal to incentivize token holders to curate information, but
differ in behavior and output: Token Curated Registries give
you a binary outcome, e.g. "yes" or "no" entrance, where as
Curved Bonding systems give you a gradient score of the
relevance of something[20].
Outside of curation markets, other cryptoeconomic primi-
tives include:
• Prediction market: incentivize coordination and allocation
of capital to correctly forecast future events
• Stablecoin: incentivize coordination and allocation of
capital to maintain the stable value of the stablecoin
relative to some measure (e.g. $1 USD)
• Bonding curves: a mathematical curve that defines a
relationship between price and token supply to avoid
pump-and-dump16.
The above examples are existing cryptoeconomic primitives,
but still very experimental. However, a lot of further research
is required to provide the tools that will unleash the full
economic potential of DLT could provide for the future.
Each mentioned primitives are interesting on their own, but
bundled together they are true powerful. The combination of
different mechanisms will enable the creation of protocols and
systems that weren’t possible prior to their existence. These
emergent systems will be greater than any of the individual
primitives on their own[20].
16Wikipedia (2018): Pump and Dump. Available online at
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pump_and_Dump
D. D: Simple Agreement on Future Tokens (SAFT)
This new agreement between investors and issuers is de-
signed to ensure that token offerings are handled correctly
under supervisory and criminal law worldwide, thereby pro-
viding investors and entrepreneurs with greater security for
their actions. SAFT intends to ensure that the offered tokens do
not violate international financial market regulations, enabling
the issuing entity to meet KYC requirements and comply
with anti-money laundering (AML) and terrorist financing
regulations.
Due to the SAFT being a non-debt financial instrument,
investors who purchase it face the possibility of losing their
money. The document only permits investors to take a financial
stake in the endeavor. This means that investors are susceptible
to the exact same enterprise risk as if they had gotten a SAFE17
instead, and at the same time incentivizing early partners to
contribute to the success of the project.
SAFT covers the most common issues of unregulated token
sales and would enable projects to obtain funding faster and
stay regulatory fully compliant. The precise conditions of a
SAFT vary and need to be aligned to the specific project fund
raising strategy and desired cryptoeconomic principles.
The following part gives an overview about the course of a
SAFT (generalized):
1) The issuing entity of a token-based decentralized net-
work enters into a written agreement, called a SAFT,
with accredited investors. They determine investment
size and the respective conversion/discount rate/pre-
emption right. The developers don’t issue any pre-
functional tokens at this stage, but they do file the
required forms with the regulators.
2) Accredited investors provide capital stock to founding
entity (developers).
3) Founding entity initiates project and develops network.
This could take months/years. Still no pre-functional
tokens are issued.
4) (Optional) Additional SAFT Series possible if more
capital is needed.
5) Once the network’s basic functionality exists, the found-
ing entity creates the token and provides the possibility
for conversion/delivery. Investors can now ideally trade
their tokens through the automated market maker or on
an open markets to realize their profit, as it is now a
consumptive token for the public[21].
17A SAFE (simple agreement for future equity) is an agreement between an
investor and a company that provides rights to the investor for future equity
in the company similar to a warrant, except without determining a specific
price per share at the time of the initial investment.
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